学術的な中国語にまだまだたどり着けない私ですが、
今日台湾人の方に修正していただいたところをこのブログにメモしておこうと思います。
Many Chinese learners are wondering what Academic Chinese is like?
Or Those people want to know how to write an Academic Chinese,
What are those skills? Well, I do not have an answer for those questions but
I will show you how my Taiwanese friends correct my academic Chinese report.
アカデミックチャイ語の結論：シンプルに主語、動詞関係を書くことにつきる。
あと日本語のように単語を並べるのは中国語ではない。
my conclusion for academic chinese is that
when you write an academic sentences, one has to focus on verbs.
one has to consider whether is this verbs able to cover next two or three
words.
修正箇所１/correction 1
before：自2000年WTO農業談判進行，會員國受到必須削減國內農業補貼，補貼等境內支持措施將會造成扭曲貿易之效果。
⇨
After： 自2000年WTO農業談判進行以來／or 2000年WTO農業談判之後，
WTO認為國內農業補貼扭曲貿易效果，會員國受到必須削減其境內支持措施。
point:
①自～plus 以來
②動詞の「受到」が説明できる範囲は一つ。
(verb‘受到’only explains one thing, therefore original sentence會員國受到必須削減國內農業補貼，補貼等境內支持措施將會造成扭曲貿易之效果 is too long.)
修正箇所２/correction ２
Before:
目前，臺灣與日本都屬於十國集團（G10）代表小農經營國家及糧食淨進口國。
⇨
After:
目前，臺灣與日本屬於代表小農經營及糧食淨進口的十國集團（G10）。
point:
一つの文に動詞は１個。
one sentence one verb.
修正箇所３/correction３
Before: 這是因為農業具有糧食安全、環境保育及鄉村發展等多功能性，因此，向WTO要求以漸進改革的方式，確保各國多樣化農業得以共存。
⇨
After: 這是因為農業具有多種功能，如糧食自給、環境保育、鄉村發展等。於是，他們向WTO要求以漸進改革的方式，確保各國多樣化農業得以共存。
Point:
① 「因為」と「因此」を一つの文に一緒に使わない。
do not use 因為 and 因此 in one sentence.
② 「したがって」と書きたい場合は、「於是」を使う。
therefore＝於是
③ 長い文を２つの文に分けた場合、後半の文章に主語を付けてあげる。
if you separate a long sentence into two, make sure give a new Subjective word for each sentence.
大家加油！我也要加油！
謝謝看這個blog!!
2012年8月10日 星期五
2012年5月31日 星期四
東日本大震災:「助けて」１日２万件、死にたい・食べてない…
５月３１日の読売新聞に震災後の「助けて、１日２万件」の悩みが無料相談所に寄せられていると聞きました。
http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20120531-00000681-yom-soci
そして一日本国民として政府と行政にお願いしたいことが２つ頭に浮かびました。
①この記事には、こういった無料相談場所がもっと必要と推測される箇所が、それは、
「インターネット上の口コミなどで存在が周知され、今では平均２０回かけてやっと通じる状態だ。」
→東日本震災のための、行政のお金であるとか電話器とか資源と人材を投資して、
被災者専用の心理指導をする機関、そして被災者の復興に向けた専門のチームが
設立されてほしいです。
②あと、子供たちの教育に関してですが、今後この被災地地区の復興＝
農林漁業など第1次産業と、工業、サービス業等の第２，第３産業の発展を視野にいれ、
今から伝統芸能を復活させてほしいです。何を主張しているのかというというと、
観光地になっても良いように、農業とその土地の農民達による芸能で農村観光が
成り立つように、そして子供達の良き心理的発展と大人の今の死にたいという気持ちを
減らすために、学校が地域の中心となって、伝統芸能に力を入れて欲しいです。
これらの伝統芸能を再生すると、なぜ子どもだけでもなく大人にも良いのか？
以下２つのケースを御覧ください。
ケース１
イギリス：廃れた元工業地ウェールズのある地域、現在失業問題に苦しんでいる。とある音楽教師が立ち上がり、伝統合唱を作った。もともとキリスト教地のこの地域では、合唱団に入ることは地位があること。子供たちは、非行行為をやめたり、いじめから立ち直った。
彼らOnly boys aloud が歌う曲は、こちら「清き心」。（こちらの英語動画には日本語字幕あり。）http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-BaR4YIqN7U
ケース２
政治家、浮島とも子氏は、元バレリーナで、阪神淡路大震災後、被災地に劇団「夢サーカス」を設立。芸術の力で神戸の復興を増進。
ケース３
台湾では、首都台北から車で約４時間離れた台南県はいわゆる農業県、毎年の台風被害もあり財政的にも貧しい国だった。しかし政府の力もあって原住民をテーマにした遊園地
”九族文化村”を設立。原住民の”若者”も踊るショーが毎日開かれている。http://blog.goo.ne.jp/kool_tada/e/db8060be44249f611fccf1cf3179737d
私個人的な願い：被災地の大人が苦しい→子供はそれを少なからずみているだろう（推測）。→学校で子供たちには芸能を身に着けて欲しい→いちか被災地が農業と工業、サービス業、そして観光業を取り戻した時、お金を払うお客さんを前にパフォーマンスしてほしい→大人には芸能を教えられる人は、学校にいって子供たちに教えてほしい。民謡よ、踊りよ復活しようぞ！
私は、台湾の李登輝元総統も、伝統芸能復活なんてことも喜ぶのでは、と考えています。
http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20120531-00000681-yom-soci
そして一日本国民として政府と行政にお願いしたいことが２つ頭に浮かびました。
①この記事には、こういった無料相談場所がもっと必要と推測される箇所が、それは、
「インターネット上の口コミなどで存在が周知され、今では平均２０回かけてやっと通じる状態だ。」
→東日本震災のための、行政のお金であるとか電話器とか資源と人材を投資して、
被災者専用の心理指導をする機関、そして被災者の復興に向けた専門のチームが
設立されてほしいです。
②あと、子供たちの教育に関してですが、今後この被災地地区の復興＝
農林漁業など第1次産業と、工業、サービス業等の第２，第３産業の発展を視野にいれ、
今から伝統芸能を復活させてほしいです。何を主張しているのかというというと、
観光地になっても良いように、農業とその土地の農民達による芸能で農村観光が
成り立つように、そして子供達の良き心理的発展と大人の今の死にたいという気持ちを
減らすために、学校が地域の中心となって、伝統芸能に力を入れて欲しいです。
これらの伝統芸能を再生すると、なぜ子どもだけでもなく大人にも良いのか？
以下２つのケースを御覧ください。
ケース１
イギリス：廃れた元工業地ウェールズのある地域、現在失業問題に苦しんでいる。とある音楽教師が立ち上がり、伝統合唱を作った。もともとキリスト教地のこの地域では、合唱団に入ることは地位があること。子供たちは、非行行為をやめたり、いじめから立ち直った。
彼らOnly boys aloud が歌う曲は、こちら「清き心」。（こちらの英語動画には日本語字幕あり。）http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-BaR4YIqN7U
ケース２
政治家、浮島とも子氏は、元バレリーナで、阪神淡路大震災後、被災地に劇団「夢サーカス」を設立。芸術の力で神戸の復興を増進。
ケース３
台湾では、首都台北から車で約４時間離れた台南県はいわゆる農業県、毎年の台風被害もあり財政的にも貧しい国だった。しかし政府の力もあって原住民をテーマにした遊園地
”九族文化村”を設立。原住民の”若者”も踊るショーが毎日開かれている。http://blog.goo.ne.jp/kool_tada/e/db8060be44249f611fccf1cf3179737d
私個人的な願い：被災地の大人が苦しい→子供はそれを少なからずみているだろう（推測）。→学校で子供たちには芸能を身に着けて欲しい→いちか被災地が農業と工業、サービス業、そして観光業を取り戻した時、お金を払うお客さんを前にパフォーマンスしてほしい→大人には芸能を教えられる人は、学校にいって子供たちに教えてほしい。民謡よ、踊りよ復活しようぞ！
私は、台湾の李登輝元総統も、伝統芸能復活なんてことも喜ぶのでは、と考えています。
李登輝氏からの手紙 : 震災特別寄稿 日本の友人たちへ
http://www.47news.jp/47topics/earthquake/5.html
2010年7月27日 星期二
BSE Issues in Japan
Introduction
As global economy grows, international trading develops and new food safety issues occur in countries. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is one of that issues that people in Japan repeatedly watched a scene on TV, a Halstein cow could not stand up and its saliva drops without its will. People believed this cattle brain disease can be transferred into human and the news causes a social panic which beef menus disappeared from a restaurant or Australian beef took place American beef in the country.
Regulatory science continues to be debated and interpreted within the structural constrains of an administrative process that still heavily dominated by politics and law . The Time when Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) announced first BSE infected cow on September 10th 2001 was one day before of United State 9/11 incident. Beside Typhoon 11 hit Japan during 10 to 11 September thereby the public did not get a big shock at the beginning . Yet administration-led risk management obtained sever criticism that they acted as if they did not expect the disease would happen in the country.
Today the nation has set series of research committees and risk assessment institutions, yet there are still ambiguous parts on risk evaluation. This paper will contribute to investigate how Japanese government has dealt with BSE issues since 1986, the time when England identified the first BSE cattle in the world, and the role of private advisory panel to administration after Japanese first BSE case of 2001.
Key word: BSE, vCJD, MBM, MAFF, MHLW
Japanese Government Policy over BSE
1986~2001
Until 2001 Japanese first BSE outbreak, the administration attempted to learn BSE countermeasures from England. However, the country neither prohibited importing meat and bone meal (MBM) nor made a framework for BSE crisis management. In June 1990, the Japan Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) send a mission to England to investigate the disease and their policy . Accordingly, in July 1990, MAFF reinforced bans on importing beef that they called a halt over importing live cattle and required MBM producers and farmers to process MBM with 30 minutes with over 136 °C heat treatment .
Despite the fact that England, Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, and Finland prohibited use of MBM by 1990 , Japanese administration moved slowly to ban on MBM usage. The Office International des Epizooties (OIE) sent their report about BSE investigation to MAFF after holding their BSE expert meetings. Although OIE pointed out that for those BSE non occurrence countries should have reviewed a policy whether a nation keeps importing ruminant protein which made by cud-chewing animals for cud-chewing animals’ feed, MAFF did not conduct any meeting or review due to completing former countermeasures (30 minutes with 136°C above heating treatment) on June to July in 1990 .
Moreover MAFF held Spongiform Encephalopathy Study Panel (牛海綿状脳症に関する検討会) from 8 April 1996, yet proposal, which means banning use of MBM, failed to pass. At that time, World Health Organization (WHO) held a Consultation on Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSE) in Geneva Switzerland from April 2 to 3 1996. TSE was to review that a group of international experts evaluated the public health issues related to BSE and the emergence of a new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Desease (vCJD) in humans, which was identified in UK on 20 March 1996 .
The Consultation suggests a couple of recommendations for the protection of public health including safe disposal of BSE products and reviewing the disposal process. Unfortunately on April 12 1996, during Agriculture Material Council (AMC) Feed Panel (農業資材審議会資料部会), which is under the authority of MAFF, discussed rulemaking process of prohibiting MBM, nonetheless, department chief of Commercial Feed Division from MAFF Livestock Industry Bureau (農林水産省畜産局流通飼料課長) claimed objection . Correspondingly AMC Feed Panel put legal procedure for banned MBM in limbo.
On April 24, Livestock Food Investigation Committee under AMC security separate session (農業資材審議会飼料部会安全性分科会家畜飼料検討委員会) became an advisory body to solve arguments between AMC Feed Panel and Commercial Feed Division. The committee, however, considered that recommendations of WHO to ban use of MBM included unspecified facts so that they will hold another new meeting when those WHO recommendations become conclusive . Although WHO sent their final report on BSE to MWHL on July 5 in the same year 1996, and they did not open the meeting until May 2001.
Government Countermeasures for BSE of 2001
The identification of BSE native-born cattle of 2001 in Japan took 46 days by undergoing four institutions’ investigations. MAFF BSE resource handout No.3 explains following BSE chronological table:
• On the August 6th in 2001, the meat hygiene examination office in Chiba prefecture (千葉県食肉衛生検査所) had diagnosed that one ox was not suit for meat.
• A week later, on August 15th, National Institute of Animal Health (NIAH: 動物衛生研究所), which is an independent administrative institution, conducted western blot test and founded BSE negative.
• On August 24th, the examination office identified that the ox brain had vacuole based on histopathological work-up. The office demanded NIAH re-test of the brain and Chiba Prefecture sent the ox brain NIAH on September 6th.
• On September 8th, NIAH announced that the result of recheck turned to negative with western blot test. On September 10th, however, the same institution diagnosed BSE positive testing result after conducting immunohistochemistry test. Consequently MAFF reported the identification of one BSE-infected cow in Chiba Prefecture and said beef was sent to incineration disposal.
• Accordingly they asked England to make a definitive diagnosis on the same day of BSE cattle outbreak. On September 20th in 2001, England government announced the positive result.
MAFF began to suspend all MBM imports, manufacturing, and distribution service since October 4th. Next day, MHLW required food processing manufacturer confirm and also report whether they use specified-risk material (SRM), which indicates cattle’s brain, the spinal cord, eyes, and ilea. MHLW decided to publish this survey result and announced each company’s confirming results by October 18th.
Japanese government has started screening of all cows since 18 October, 2001, however this contained a political consideration. Nobuo Shimegi, Professor of Seigakuin University, describes that legally assigning screening and SRM remove over 30 months year old cattle is not bad as EU criteria does the same. However, Japanese government forces this measurement to under 30 months year old caws in order to avoid widen worries to among the people. The government also asks foreign countries which export their beef to Japan to do these two tests, so that this met with downright hostility because of the cost and time.
Problems of Administration Procedures
In order to identify the first BSE cattle, the Japanese government was totally undefended and had not arranged any important social regulations. Kamisato Tatsuhiro, who is a fellow of RISTEX (Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society), asserts that the reason for the country had time consuming BSE test procedure was because no one expected the possibility of domestic exposure.
Kamisato regards that people in ministry and institute had an attitude, which is likewise fire on the other side of river, caused following three disadvantages ;
• Informing related information goes wrong due to the absence of person in charge.
• Communication system for BSE did not exist among research institutions and administrators.
• NIAH misused test kit.
For example, although MAFF reported BSE-infected cow was sent to incineration on September 10th, but two days later, the department of animal industry from Chiba Prefecture sent FAX to MHLW that the cow was actually designated for rendering process and became food for fishes.
For another, MAFF people did not understand the degree of domestic BSE research progress. It was quite awkward that MAFF asked England to make a definitive diagnosis because Japanese researchers had formed the basics of what England adopted as their definitive diagnosis. Notably the Obihiro University of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine has been one step ahead on BSE studies .
Suitably Kamisato points out that food related issues have been controlled by the MAFF and MHLW respectively under nonintervention policy one another.
“While in general, the MAFF managed the agricultural sector in order to protect and promote it, the MHLW was in charge of the food hygiene for the nation’s food security. This bureaucratic sectionalism had been maintained since the 19th century. Although there was an enormous government reform in January 2001, the food administration system remained the same. --- Furthermore, while the MAFF has the authority to permit the use of agricultural chemicals based on toxicity tests, the MHLW has the control to set the standards for residual agricultural chemicals .”
The problematic administration attitude caused various types of social chaos. First of all, consumer’s anxiety not only hit beef products that demand for beef declined as well as price went down, but also make meat industries suffer from financial difficulties such as dairy farming, beef farmers, beef restaurants .
While the media harshly criticized veterinarians for slow tempo, in 2002, the 29-year-old female veterinarian committed suicide, as officials at Kushiro Public Health Center in Hokkaido Prefecture said . In fact cow’s eyes, which she diagnosed as BSE negative, does not determination of the disease but people believed she was wrong and administrations did not cover additional information to the media.
Private Advisory Panel to Verify Administrative Problems
Japanese BSE Investigation Committee
A private advisory panel to Minister for Agriculture, Forest, and Fisheries, and also to Minister for Health, Labor and Welfare Ministries was established on November 6th, 2001. At that time, although the government already put all cattle, which went through blanket testing, into execution, those beef and related products had been experiencing a continuous downturn in consumption . The panel was named as BSE Investigation Committee (JBIC : BSE問題に関する調査検討委員会) and ten members were chosen with mutual vote within the panel.
Those ten members was made up of three veterinary scientists, three journalists, two Consumers’ Groups members, one specialist in infectious disease, and one agrarian economics scholar. Two ministers of MAFF and MHLW assigned them to deliberate on two agendas. First agenda was to verify problems in administrative procedures on BSE. Second agenda was to discuss future government functions how the public administration over livestock industry and food sanitation should be.
The Committee was somewhat different from traditional advisory body to the government. Masarou Takahashi, Professor of Kagawa Education Institute of Nutrition, marks two features of JBIC. First of all, they hold an open hearing from the beginning to the end. While ten members proceed with round-table meeting in a separate room, ordinal people could listen to a discussion via TV monitors. In addition, all conference minutes were shown on MAFF website. Subsequently except the media reporters, about seventy public participated in listening in every meeting, and those meeting were widely reported on TV and newspapers, JBIC was under close observation by the public.
Secondly the Committee adopted a unique meeting way, despite the fact that bureaucracy prepares draft in most advisory panels, selected members from the Committee make a draft text and adjust it within meetings. The chairman suggests so called today’s skeleton and decide a person, who will charge making a draft from committee members.
The Committee all together held 11th meetings and took thirty hours for this. They submitted to MAFF and MHLW the final JBIC report on April 2nd in 2002. Remarkably they highlighted four problems as administrative countermeasures on BSE, seven parts to need to improve, and two proposals for new government, which are able to convey what they can do to improve public health.
Those four problems, which JBIC underlined in the first part of the final report, are following next.
• Japan was slow to respond banning use of MBM, even though MAFF dispatched experts to England in 1990 (See Table 3).
• MAFF caused a serious misadministration that they did not re-hold meeting by Agriculture Material Council (AMC) Feed Panel until 2001 after vCJD was found in 1996, in spite of the fact that U.S. and Australia legally banned use of MBM in 1987.
• MAFF should announced the public Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of the Europe Union evaluation result in June 2001. GBR ranked Japan as Number 3 BSE dangerous nation due to the country’s continuous import of MBM and use of MBM. Although GBR evaluated Japan as highly BSE risky country, MAFF did not release the result to the public. Moreover they demanded EU to discontinue the assessment in the future with petition of objection.
• MAFF was completely unprepared for the first BSE outbreak that they had GBR criticism and BSE knowledge from England, it took 46 days to certain the first BSE infected cow. This time consuming bungled policy increased sense of distrust from the public.
Next JBIC introduced seven points at issue which also indicate where Japanese government need to change.
• Lack of risk awareness and absence of crisis management framework
• Administration thought little of producer-oriented policy and consumer protection
• Administrative organizations had an uncertainty in decision making
• Lack of communication between MAFF and MHLW
• The government had not reflected experts’ opinion appropriately
• Disclosure of information was not always straight and it led lack of people’s understanding about food safety policies
• Existing food safety laws and systems are required to reform
The last chapter of JBIC final report suggests two fundamental rules that Japanese government should adopt to improve food safety administration.
• Consumer protection as the top priority
• Introduction of risk analysis methods in the country
Food Safety Commission as New Regulatory Agency
Food Safety Commission
Based on enactment of Food Safety Basic Bill (食品安全基本法) in May 2001, cabinet-led Food Safety Commission (FSC: 食品安全委員会) was established on July 1st in 2001 . Japanese cabinet started to prepare to establish this Commission since April 5th 2002 with about two billion yen (約２０億円) budget. According to the Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet website, those members of FSC are consist of seven people who are in the field of toxicology, microorganism, chemical material, community hygiene, food production and distribution system, consumers’ awareness and behavior, and expert on information exchange.
FSC has set up three major operations, which indicate most of their work is to address risk evaluation. Those three service contexts are as next:
1. Conducting risk assessment on food in a scientific, independent, and fair manner, and making recommendations to relevant ministries based upon the results from the risk assessment.
2. Implementing risk communication among stakeholders such as consumers and food-related business operators.
3. Responding to food-borne accidents and emergencies.
Figure 1. Role of the Food Safety Commission
Source: FSC website
Under the Commission, the Expert Committee has established, which charges different individual risk assessment. Accordingly those about 240 member experts work in either Chemical Substance Assessment Groups, Biological Materials Assessment Groups, or Emerging Foods Assessment Groups. Additionally FSC also owns a secretariat, which deals with general affairs, supports for risk assessment, recommendation and public relations, information and emergency response, and director for risk communication as FSC website shows.
New Tasks for New Food Safety Administrations
Pressures from Meat Industries
Despite the fact that Japan had imported American beef since 1991, FSC is now engaged to advice ministries whether prohibit use of MBM and import other countries’ beef. Once the government decides to ban use of MBM or beef imports, FSC is required to hasten taking all necessary measures to lift up all bans. In March 2003, Japan Federation of Economic Organization (JFEO:
日本経済団体連合会：経団連) in the press conference addressed that the government should not postpone the resumption of U.S. beef imports because longer ban would generate issues of economic friction . JFEO also demanded the Cabinet hold more FSC meetings to solve the problem.
In Addition to this, JFEO demanded MAFF to lift up ban on MBM imports, which is specifically for pet food, on October 27th in 2003 that expect MBM made by cow, other kinds of MBM for pet food should remove name from banned MBM . To avoid misuse of those useful MBM, they suggest that exporting countries add an export inspection certificate and/or a government specifies processing treatment factories for export MBM, etc.
Those incomes of domestic MBM manufacture companies are quite stable. The Akahata Newspaper, which is published by Japanese Communist Party, reports that MBM industry giant, Tokushima Processing Corp., had obtained in total 6 billion yen (60億円) interest free loan from Tokushima Prefecture and City governments until 2002 . Furthermore, these two government lend refunds which the company pay back to them. The newspaper notes that this process was one of regional improvement projects as the prefecture and city governments state.
Table 4. Chronological Administration Movements to Suspend U.S. Beef Imports
Time Administration Countermeasure
26 Dec 2003 US announced first discovery of BSE cattle on 23th, MAFF suspended importation of U.S. beef.
15 Oct 2004 MAFF and MHLW requested FSC﹡ food impact evaluation on BSE.
5 Feb 2005 Discovery of the first vCJD in Japan
28 Mar 2005 FSC’s one of Expert Committees, Prion Expert Committee, submit a report of BSE food impact evaluation to FSC.
6 May 2005 FSC returned above report to MAFF and MHLW.
8 Dec 2005 FSC returned a report on “Risks of U.S. and Canada Beef” to MAFF and MHLW.
12 Dec 2005 The Cabinet made a formal decision over resumption of US beef imports.
20 Jan 2006 U.S. meatpacker had violated safety rule that beef calf included its spine so that the government ban U.S. beef imports.
27 Jul 2006 The ban of January 20th in 2006 was lifted as of July 27th, 2006.
﹡In specific, two ministries asked one of FSC’s committee (食品安全員会), which is active since 2003.
Source: 標宣男「BSE問題を考える」『聖学院大学論叢』20（2）、2008年、11－38頁、13頁。
Pursue in-depth Risk Assessment
One should bear in mind that both government and industry often tend to have stakes in constructing scientific knowledge to fit particular policy ends when it comes to design or conduct of policy-relevant research . The chairman of JBIC, Prof. Takahashi Masarou, asserts that institute which conducts risk assessment must maintain its independence, excellence, and transparency . He might concern a way of selecting committee members that JBIC took mutual vote system. When it comes to retain independence, no member should represent a voice of an interest group. At present, there is no institution to investigate whether FSC disclose all of their meeting information. Those regulatory agencies must take into account legal and political considerations should not influence on food safety risk evaluation and its research.
Conclusions
Although Japan has studied BSE problem reasons and countermeasures from England since 1990 by dispatching experts, the domestic BSE identification of 2001 revealed countermeasures were decided not scientifically but politically. The government failed risk management in the ban of MBM was found. Both bureaucrats in MAFF and MHLW did not expect domestic exposure and the attitude led miscommunication among them and also between bureaucrats and academies. Since a communication system for BSE did not exist at that time, the Cabinet ordered top-down private advisory panel to fulfill this issue with the establishment Japanese BSE Investigation Committee and Food Safety Commission. This change of administration is considered to be a drastic reformation of food safety policy in Japan’s food policy history . Under the JBIC, Japan finally banned use on MBM in September 2001. With the contribution of FSC, the nation also went through twice steps to suspend importation of U.S. beef in 2003 and 2006 respectively but these action generated protest movements from business industries. Approaching to beef imports, longer resumption of U.S. beef would result in the diplomatic problem. At this moment, members of these commissions are selected by mutual vote thereby no once can actually determine whether their researches does or does not involve any political or legal reflections. In the future, one might continue to study not only how Japanese government shift to consumer-oriented administration, but also how they manage these new committees.
References
English
FSC, (2010). Role of the Food Safety Commission. http://www.fsc.go.jp/english/aboutus/roleofthefoodsaftycommission.html
Kyodo News Agency, (2002). “Gov’t panel confirms 4th Japanese cow infected with BSE,” Kyodo, May 13, 2002. Tokyo: Kyodo News.
Sheila Jasanoff. (1990). “10 Technocracy Revisited” The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers, Harvard University Press, pp.208.
Tatsuhiro Kamisato. (2005). “BSE Crisis in Japan: A Chronological Overview,” Environmental Health and Preventive Medicine 10, pp.295-302, pp.295.
World Health Organization (WHO). (1996). Report of a WHO Consultation on Public Health Issues related to Human and Animal Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies. WHO/EMC/DIS/96.147 Geneva, Switzerland 2-3 April 1996.
Japanese
経団連「奥田会長記者会見」『日本経団連タイムス』No.2758、2005年3月10日。
経団連『政策提言/調査報告2003年』http://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2003/098/15.pdf
食の安全・監視市民委員会事務局（fswatch）「公開質問状を食品安全委員会委員長に提出」、2003年。http://www.fswatch.org/2003/9-14.htm
BSE問題に関する調査検討委員会『BSE問題に関する調査検討委員会報告』厚生労働省、農林水産省、2002年。(meaning Japanese BSE Investigation Committee: JBIC. (2002). BSE Investigation Committee Report, pp.4. Tokyo: MWHL & MAFF.)
高橋正郎「BSE問題の総括と研究者の課題」『日本畜産会報74（2）』2003年、169－175頁。
標宣男「BSE問題を考える」『聖学院大学論叢』20（2）、2008年、11－38頁。
首相官邸「食品安全委員会の構成」『食品安全行政に関する関係閣僚会議』http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/shokuhin/
関谷直也、大西勝也、廣井脩「2001年BSEの社会影響と対策」東京大学社会情報研究所調査研究紀要19、2003年、231−362頁、２頁。
日本共産党「肉骨粉業界最大手の徳島化製」『しんぶん赤旗』2002年2月12日。
農林水産省「牛海綿状脳症（BSE）感染牛の発生に係る対応の経緯について」参考配布３。http://www.maff.go.jp/work/bse8/sanko3.pdf
As global economy grows, international trading develops and new food safety issues occur in countries. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is one of that issues that people in Japan repeatedly watched a scene on TV, a Halstein cow could not stand up and its saliva drops without its will. People believed this cattle brain disease can be transferred into human and the news causes a social panic which beef menus disappeared from a restaurant or Australian beef took place American beef in the country.
Regulatory science continues to be debated and interpreted within the structural constrains of an administrative process that still heavily dominated by politics and law . The Time when Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) announced first BSE infected cow on September 10th 2001 was one day before of United State 9/11 incident. Beside Typhoon 11 hit Japan during 10 to 11 September thereby the public did not get a big shock at the beginning . Yet administration-led risk management obtained sever criticism that they acted as if they did not expect the disease would happen in the country.
Today the nation has set series of research committees and risk assessment institutions, yet there are still ambiguous parts on risk evaluation. This paper will contribute to investigate how Japanese government has dealt with BSE issues since 1986, the time when England identified the first BSE cattle in the world, and the role of private advisory panel to administration after Japanese first BSE case of 2001.
Key word: BSE, vCJD, MBM, MAFF, MHLW
Japanese Government Policy over BSE
1986~2001
Until 2001 Japanese first BSE outbreak, the administration attempted to learn BSE countermeasures from England. However, the country neither prohibited importing meat and bone meal (MBM) nor made a framework for BSE crisis management. In June 1990, the Japan Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) send a mission to England to investigate the disease and their policy . Accordingly, in July 1990, MAFF reinforced bans on importing beef that they called a halt over importing live cattle and required MBM producers and farmers to process MBM with 30 minutes with over 136 °C heat treatment .
Despite the fact that England, Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, and Finland prohibited use of MBM by 1990 , Japanese administration moved slowly to ban on MBM usage. The Office International des Epizooties (OIE) sent their report about BSE investigation to MAFF after holding their BSE expert meetings. Although OIE pointed out that for those BSE non occurrence countries should have reviewed a policy whether a nation keeps importing ruminant protein which made by cud-chewing animals for cud-chewing animals’ feed, MAFF did not conduct any meeting or review due to completing former countermeasures (30 minutes with 136°C above heating treatment) on June to July in 1990 .
Moreover MAFF held Spongiform Encephalopathy Study Panel (牛海綿状脳症に関する検討会) from 8 April 1996, yet proposal, which means banning use of MBM, failed to pass. At that time, World Health Organization (WHO) held a Consultation on Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSE) in Geneva Switzerland from April 2 to 3 1996. TSE was to review that a group of international experts evaluated the public health issues related to BSE and the emergence of a new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Desease (vCJD) in humans, which was identified in UK on 20 March 1996 .
The Consultation suggests a couple of recommendations for the protection of public health including safe disposal of BSE products and reviewing the disposal process. Unfortunately on April 12 1996, during Agriculture Material Council (AMC) Feed Panel (農業資材審議会資料部会), which is under the authority of MAFF, discussed rulemaking process of prohibiting MBM, nonetheless, department chief of Commercial Feed Division from MAFF Livestock Industry Bureau (農林水産省畜産局流通飼料課長) claimed objection . Correspondingly AMC Feed Panel put legal procedure for banned MBM in limbo.
On April 24, Livestock Food Investigation Committee under AMC security separate session (農業資材審議会飼料部会安全性分科会家畜飼料検討委員会) became an advisory body to solve arguments between AMC Feed Panel and Commercial Feed Division. The committee, however, considered that recommendations of WHO to ban use of MBM included unspecified facts so that they will hold another new meeting when those WHO recommendations become conclusive . Although WHO sent their final report on BSE to MWHL on July 5 in the same year 1996, and they did not open the meeting until May 2001.
Government Countermeasures for BSE of 2001
The identification of BSE native-born cattle of 2001 in Japan took 46 days by undergoing four institutions’ investigations. MAFF BSE resource handout No.3 explains following BSE chronological table:
• On the August 6th in 2001, the meat hygiene examination office in Chiba prefecture (千葉県食肉衛生検査所) had diagnosed that one ox was not suit for meat.
• A week later, on August 15th, National Institute of Animal Health (NIAH: 動物衛生研究所), which is an independent administrative institution, conducted western blot test and founded BSE negative.
• On August 24th, the examination office identified that the ox brain had vacuole based on histopathological work-up. The office demanded NIAH re-test of the brain and Chiba Prefecture sent the ox brain NIAH on September 6th.
• On September 8th, NIAH announced that the result of recheck turned to negative with western blot test. On September 10th, however, the same institution diagnosed BSE positive testing result after conducting immunohistochemistry test. Consequently MAFF reported the identification of one BSE-infected cow in Chiba Prefecture and said beef was sent to incineration disposal.
• Accordingly they asked England to make a definitive diagnosis on the same day of BSE cattle outbreak. On September 20th in 2001, England government announced the positive result.
MAFF began to suspend all MBM imports, manufacturing, and distribution service since October 4th. Next day, MHLW required food processing manufacturer confirm and also report whether they use specified-risk material (SRM), which indicates cattle’s brain, the spinal cord, eyes, and ilea. MHLW decided to publish this survey result and announced each company’s confirming results by October 18th.
Japanese government has started screening of all cows since 18 October, 2001, however this contained a political consideration. Nobuo Shimegi, Professor of Seigakuin University, describes that legally assigning screening and SRM remove over 30 months year old cattle is not bad as EU criteria does the same. However, Japanese government forces this measurement to under 30 months year old caws in order to avoid widen worries to among the people. The government also asks foreign countries which export their beef to Japan to do these two tests, so that this met with downright hostility because of the cost and time.
Problems of Administration Procedures
In order to identify the first BSE cattle, the Japanese government was totally undefended and had not arranged any important social regulations. Kamisato Tatsuhiro, who is a fellow of RISTEX (Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society), asserts that the reason for the country had time consuming BSE test procedure was because no one expected the possibility of domestic exposure.
Kamisato regards that people in ministry and institute had an attitude, which is likewise fire on the other side of river, caused following three disadvantages ;
• Informing related information goes wrong due to the absence of person in charge.
• Communication system for BSE did not exist among research institutions and administrators.
• NIAH misused test kit.
For example, although MAFF reported BSE-infected cow was sent to incineration on September 10th, but two days later, the department of animal industry from Chiba Prefecture sent FAX to MHLW that the cow was actually designated for rendering process and became food for fishes.
For another, MAFF people did not understand the degree of domestic BSE research progress. It was quite awkward that MAFF asked England to make a definitive diagnosis because Japanese researchers had formed the basics of what England adopted as their definitive diagnosis. Notably the Obihiro University of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine has been one step ahead on BSE studies .
Suitably Kamisato points out that food related issues have been controlled by the MAFF and MHLW respectively under nonintervention policy one another.
“While in general, the MAFF managed the agricultural sector in order to protect and promote it, the MHLW was in charge of the food hygiene for the nation’s food security. This bureaucratic sectionalism had been maintained since the 19th century. Although there was an enormous government reform in January 2001, the food administration system remained the same. --- Furthermore, while the MAFF has the authority to permit the use of agricultural chemicals based on toxicity tests, the MHLW has the control to set the standards for residual agricultural chemicals .”
The problematic administration attitude caused various types of social chaos. First of all, consumer’s anxiety not only hit beef products that demand for beef declined as well as price went down, but also make meat industries suffer from financial difficulties such as dairy farming, beef farmers, beef restaurants .
While the media harshly criticized veterinarians for slow tempo, in 2002, the 29-year-old female veterinarian committed suicide, as officials at Kushiro Public Health Center in Hokkaido Prefecture said . In fact cow’s eyes, which she diagnosed as BSE negative, does not determination of the disease but people believed she was wrong and administrations did not cover additional information to the media.
Private Advisory Panel to Verify Administrative Problems
Japanese BSE Investigation Committee
A private advisory panel to Minister for Agriculture, Forest, and Fisheries, and also to Minister for Health, Labor and Welfare Ministries was established on November 6th, 2001. At that time, although the government already put all cattle, which went through blanket testing, into execution, those beef and related products had been experiencing a continuous downturn in consumption . The panel was named as BSE Investigation Committee (JBIC : BSE問題に関する調査検討委員会) and ten members were chosen with mutual vote within the panel.
Those ten members was made up of three veterinary scientists, three journalists, two Consumers’ Groups members, one specialist in infectious disease, and one agrarian economics scholar. Two ministers of MAFF and MHLW assigned them to deliberate on two agendas. First agenda was to verify problems in administrative procedures on BSE. Second agenda was to discuss future government functions how the public administration over livestock industry and food sanitation should be.
The Committee was somewhat different from traditional advisory body to the government. Masarou Takahashi, Professor of Kagawa Education Institute of Nutrition, marks two features of JBIC. First of all, they hold an open hearing from the beginning to the end. While ten members proceed with round-table meeting in a separate room, ordinal people could listen to a discussion via TV monitors. In addition, all conference minutes were shown on MAFF website. Subsequently except the media reporters, about seventy public participated in listening in every meeting, and those meeting were widely reported on TV and newspapers, JBIC was under close observation by the public.
Secondly the Committee adopted a unique meeting way, despite the fact that bureaucracy prepares draft in most advisory panels, selected members from the Committee make a draft text and adjust it within meetings. The chairman suggests so called today’s skeleton and decide a person, who will charge making a draft from committee members.
The Committee all together held 11th meetings and took thirty hours for this. They submitted to MAFF and MHLW the final JBIC report on April 2nd in 2002. Remarkably they highlighted four problems as administrative countermeasures on BSE, seven parts to need to improve, and two proposals for new government, which are able to convey what they can do to improve public health.
Those four problems, which JBIC underlined in the first part of the final report, are following next.
• Japan was slow to respond banning use of MBM, even though MAFF dispatched experts to England in 1990 (See Table 3).
• MAFF caused a serious misadministration that they did not re-hold meeting by Agriculture Material Council (AMC) Feed Panel until 2001 after vCJD was found in 1996, in spite of the fact that U.S. and Australia legally banned use of MBM in 1987.
• MAFF should announced the public Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of the Europe Union evaluation result in June 2001. GBR ranked Japan as Number 3 BSE dangerous nation due to the country’s continuous import of MBM and use of MBM. Although GBR evaluated Japan as highly BSE risky country, MAFF did not release the result to the public. Moreover they demanded EU to discontinue the assessment in the future with petition of objection.
• MAFF was completely unprepared for the first BSE outbreak that they had GBR criticism and BSE knowledge from England, it took 46 days to certain the first BSE infected cow. This time consuming bungled policy increased sense of distrust from the public.
Next JBIC introduced seven points at issue which also indicate where Japanese government need to change.
• Lack of risk awareness and absence of crisis management framework
• Administration thought little of producer-oriented policy and consumer protection
• Administrative organizations had an uncertainty in decision making
• Lack of communication between MAFF and MHLW
• The government had not reflected experts’ opinion appropriately
• Disclosure of information was not always straight and it led lack of people’s understanding about food safety policies
• Existing food safety laws and systems are required to reform
The last chapter of JBIC final report suggests two fundamental rules that Japanese government should adopt to improve food safety administration.
• Consumer protection as the top priority
• Introduction of risk analysis methods in the country
Food Safety Commission as New Regulatory Agency
Food Safety Commission
Based on enactment of Food Safety Basic Bill (食品安全基本法) in May 2001, cabinet-led Food Safety Commission (FSC: 食品安全委員会) was established on July 1st in 2001 . Japanese cabinet started to prepare to establish this Commission since April 5th 2002 with about two billion yen (約２０億円) budget. According to the Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet website, those members of FSC are consist of seven people who are in the field of toxicology, microorganism, chemical material, community hygiene, food production and distribution system, consumers’ awareness and behavior, and expert on information exchange.
FSC has set up three major operations, which indicate most of their work is to address risk evaluation. Those three service contexts are as next:
1. Conducting risk assessment on food in a scientific, independent, and fair manner, and making recommendations to relevant ministries based upon the results from the risk assessment.
2. Implementing risk communication among stakeholders such as consumers and food-related business operators.
3. Responding to food-borne accidents and emergencies.
Figure 1. Role of the Food Safety Commission
Source: FSC website
Under the Commission, the Expert Committee has established, which charges different individual risk assessment. Accordingly those about 240 member experts work in either Chemical Substance Assessment Groups, Biological Materials Assessment Groups, or Emerging Foods Assessment Groups. Additionally FSC also owns a secretariat, which deals with general affairs, supports for risk assessment, recommendation and public relations, information and emergency response, and director for risk communication as FSC website shows.
New Tasks for New Food Safety Administrations
Pressures from Meat Industries
Despite the fact that Japan had imported American beef since 1991, FSC is now engaged to advice ministries whether prohibit use of MBM and import other countries’ beef. Once the government decides to ban use of MBM or beef imports, FSC is required to hasten taking all necessary measures to lift up all bans. In March 2003, Japan Federation of Economic Organization (JFEO:
日本経済団体連合会：経団連) in the press conference addressed that the government should not postpone the resumption of U.S. beef imports because longer ban would generate issues of economic friction . JFEO also demanded the Cabinet hold more FSC meetings to solve the problem.
In Addition to this, JFEO demanded MAFF to lift up ban on MBM imports, which is specifically for pet food, on October 27th in 2003 that expect MBM made by cow, other kinds of MBM for pet food should remove name from banned MBM . To avoid misuse of those useful MBM, they suggest that exporting countries add an export inspection certificate and/or a government specifies processing treatment factories for export MBM, etc.
Those incomes of domestic MBM manufacture companies are quite stable. The Akahata Newspaper, which is published by Japanese Communist Party, reports that MBM industry giant, Tokushima Processing Corp., had obtained in total 6 billion yen (60億円) interest free loan from Tokushima Prefecture and City governments until 2002 . Furthermore, these two government lend refunds which the company pay back to them. The newspaper notes that this process was one of regional improvement projects as the prefecture and city governments state.
Table 4. Chronological Administration Movements to Suspend U.S. Beef Imports
Time Administration Countermeasure
26 Dec 2003 US announced first discovery of BSE cattle on 23th, MAFF suspended importation of U.S. beef.
15 Oct 2004 MAFF and MHLW requested FSC﹡ food impact evaluation on BSE.
5 Feb 2005 Discovery of the first vCJD in Japan
28 Mar 2005 FSC’s one of Expert Committees, Prion Expert Committee, submit a report of BSE food impact evaluation to FSC.
6 May 2005 FSC returned above report to MAFF and MHLW.
8 Dec 2005 FSC returned a report on “Risks of U.S. and Canada Beef” to MAFF and MHLW.
12 Dec 2005 The Cabinet made a formal decision over resumption of US beef imports.
20 Jan 2006 U.S. meatpacker had violated safety rule that beef calf included its spine so that the government ban U.S. beef imports.
27 Jul 2006 The ban of January 20th in 2006 was lifted as of July 27th, 2006.
﹡In specific, two ministries asked one of FSC’s committee (食品安全員会), which is active since 2003.
Source: 標宣男「BSE問題を考える」『聖学院大学論叢』20（2）、2008年、11－38頁、13頁。
Pursue in-depth Risk Assessment
One should bear in mind that both government and industry often tend to have stakes in constructing scientific knowledge to fit particular policy ends when it comes to design or conduct of policy-relevant research . The chairman of JBIC, Prof. Takahashi Masarou, asserts that institute which conducts risk assessment must maintain its independence, excellence, and transparency . He might concern a way of selecting committee members that JBIC took mutual vote system. When it comes to retain independence, no member should represent a voice of an interest group. At present, there is no institution to investigate whether FSC disclose all of their meeting information. Those regulatory agencies must take into account legal and political considerations should not influence on food safety risk evaluation and its research.
Conclusions
Although Japan has studied BSE problem reasons and countermeasures from England since 1990 by dispatching experts, the domestic BSE identification of 2001 revealed countermeasures were decided not scientifically but politically. The government failed risk management in the ban of MBM was found. Both bureaucrats in MAFF and MHLW did not expect domestic exposure and the attitude led miscommunication among them and also between bureaucrats and academies. Since a communication system for BSE did not exist at that time, the Cabinet ordered top-down private advisory panel to fulfill this issue with the establishment Japanese BSE Investigation Committee and Food Safety Commission. This change of administration is considered to be a drastic reformation of food safety policy in Japan’s food policy history . Under the JBIC, Japan finally banned use on MBM in September 2001. With the contribution of FSC, the nation also went through twice steps to suspend importation of U.S. beef in 2003 and 2006 respectively but these action generated protest movements from business industries. Approaching to beef imports, longer resumption of U.S. beef would result in the diplomatic problem. At this moment, members of these commissions are selected by mutual vote thereby no once can actually determine whether their researches does or does not involve any political or legal reflections. In the future, one might continue to study not only how Japanese government shift to consumer-oriented administration, but also how they manage these new committees.
References
English
FSC, (2010). Role of the Food Safety Commission. http://www.fsc.go.jp/english/aboutus/roleofthefoodsaftycommission.html
Kyodo News Agency, (2002). “Gov’t panel confirms 4th Japanese cow infected with BSE,” Kyodo, May 13, 2002. Tokyo: Kyodo News.
Sheila Jasanoff. (1990). “10 Technocracy Revisited” The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers, Harvard University Press, pp.208.
Tatsuhiro Kamisato. (2005). “BSE Crisis in Japan: A Chronological Overview,” Environmental Health and Preventive Medicine 10, pp.295-302, pp.295.
World Health Organization (WHO). (1996). Report of a WHO Consultation on Public Health Issues related to Human and Animal Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies. WHO/EMC/DIS/96.147 Geneva, Switzerland 2-3 April 1996.
Japanese
経団連「奥田会長記者会見」『日本経団連タイムス』No.2758、2005年3月10日。
経団連『政策提言/調査報告2003年』http://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2003/098/15.pdf
食の安全・監視市民委員会事務局（fswatch）「公開質問状を食品安全委員会委員長に提出」、2003年。http://www.fswatch.org/2003/9-14.htm
BSE問題に関する調査検討委員会『BSE問題に関する調査検討委員会報告』厚生労働省、農林水産省、2002年。(meaning Japanese BSE Investigation Committee: JBIC. (2002). BSE Investigation Committee Report, pp.4. Tokyo: MWHL & MAFF.)
高橋正郎「BSE問題の総括と研究者の課題」『日本畜産会報74（2）』2003年、169－175頁。
標宣男「BSE問題を考える」『聖学院大学論叢』20（2）、2008年、11－38頁。
首相官邸「食品安全委員会の構成」『食品安全行政に関する関係閣僚会議』http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/shokuhin/
関谷直也、大西勝也、廣井脩「2001年BSEの社会影響と対策」東京大学社会情報研究所調査研究紀要19、2003年、231−362頁、２頁。
日本共産党「肉骨粉業界最大手の徳島化製」『しんぶん赤旗』2002年2月12日。
農林水産省「牛海綿状脳症（BSE）感染牛の発生に係る対応の経緯について」参考配布３。http://www.maff.go.jp/work/bse8/sanko3.pdf
2010年7月16日 星期五
お腹出てる若い男子学生多し
うちのいる大学で出あう
男子学生はほとんどみな
お酒を飲まないのに
なぜか
ポコンと
お腹だけが出てます。
なんであーいう体系になるんだろう？
女子学生の
肉のつき方とか骨格がちがうのはわかるけど、
男子学生は
お腹もでてるけど
ほどよく脂肪がむきむき筋肉に見える人が多い。
油ものばっかり食べてるからかな？
自分の子供ができなら
お腹だけ出ててもかわいんだけど
不健康そうだから
気をつけさせたい
いまも彼にお腹のポコリも
なんとかしたい
ま、健康だったらいいんだけど
男子学生はほとんどみな
お酒を飲まないのに
なぜか
ポコンと
お腹だけが出てます。
なんであーいう体系になるんだろう？
女子学生の
肉のつき方とか骨格がちがうのはわかるけど、
男子学生は
お腹もでてるけど
ほどよく脂肪がむきむき筋肉に見える人が多い。
油ものばっかり食べてるからかな？
自分の子供ができなら
お腹だけ出ててもかわいんだけど
不健康そうだから
気をつけさせたい
いまも彼にお腹のポコリも
なんとかしたい
ま、健康だったらいいんだけど
ゴキブリってトイレに流すんだ～
うち虫はたたいたり、
スプレーで殺したら、
ティッシュでくるんで
ゴミ箱に捨てるもんだと思ってましたが、
彼の友達の家のお母さんも
彼も
院の同級生らも
結構ゴキブリは
サンダルとかで
たたいてころしたら
トイレに流してます。
ま、ゴミ箱にいなくてよいかも。
うちもこの方式に従おう！
でもスプレーでやっつけるー
たたけません。
最近毎日いるのよね、おうちに。。
暑いと嫌だ
家は６階なのに、
排水溝あたりにいて、
ライトとかつけて
ゴキをみつけると
自然に排水溝の穴にもぐってもどる。。
彼になんどか
やっつけてもらったけど
台湾にいるかぎり
共存ね。。。
スプレーで殺したら、
ティッシュでくるんで
ゴミ箱に捨てるもんだと思ってましたが、
彼の友達の家のお母さんも
彼も
院の同級生らも
結構ゴキブリは
サンダルとかで
たたいてころしたら
トイレに流してます。
ま、ゴミ箱にいなくてよいかも。
うちもこの方式に従おう！
でもスプレーでやっつけるー
たたけません。
最近毎日いるのよね、おうちに。。
暑いと嫌だ
家は６階なのに、
排水溝あたりにいて、
ライトとかつけて
ゴキをみつけると
自然に排水溝の穴にもぐってもどる。。
彼になんどか
やっつけてもらったけど
台湾にいるかぎり
共存ね。。。
お経を電車で読む人多くない？
今日はちょっとサプライズ
お昼の電車に乗って学校に来たのですが、
隣できれいなお姉さんが
お経立って読んでた。
お姉さんも！なんだ
と思いました。
あと昼でもいるのかと。
いつもは夜電車で
よく中年のおばさんが
お経を読んでたり
小声で唱えてるのを
毎日のようみ見かけますが、
昼でもお姉さんもありなんですね。
やっぱ周りの目を気にしない人が多いから
お経読む人をたくさん見かけるのかな？
っていっても自分の乗る車両にたぶん①人くらいですけど、、。
信仰深い人は
こちらで自分を包み隠さず
本当に信仰深いと思います。
前に台湾の女の子と
旅行に行ったら、
夜トイレで聖書読んでくると言われ、
えっ、そんな追いやらないから
トイレにこもんなくても大丈夫だよと
たじたじになってしまいました。
あと韓国のうちの友達もそうだったけど、
初対面から、やっぱり食べる前に
静かに神にお祈りするひと
結構こちらでいる気がします。
慣れないうちはびっくりですが、
感謝するところは
見習いたいです。
お昼の電車に乗って学校に来たのですが、
隣できれいなお姉さんが
お経立って読んでた。
お姉さんも！なんだ
と思いました。
あと昼でもいるのかと。
いつもは夜電車で
よく中年のおばさんが
お経を読んでたり
小声で唱えてるのを
毎日のようみ見かけますが、
昼でもお姉さんもありなんですね。
やっぱ周りの目を気にしない人が多いから
お経読む人をたくさん見かけるのかな？
っていっても自分の乗る車両にたぶん①人くらいですけど、、。
信仰深い人は
こちらで自分を包み隠さず
本当に信仰深いと思います。
前に台湾の女の子と
旅行に行ったら、
夜トイレで聖書読んでくると言われ、
えっ、そんな追いやらないから
トイレにこもんなくても大丈夫だよと
たじたじになってしまいました。
あと韓国のうちの友達もそうだったけど、
初対面から、やっぱり食べる前に
静かに神にお祈りするひと
結構こちらでいる気がします。
慣れないうちはびっくりですが、
感謝するところは
見習いたいです。
2010年7月15日 星期四
カーテンあまり使わない？
夜電車に乗って
学校から家に帰るとき、
たくさんのアパート、マンションの
家の中が見えてしまうのですが、
みんな夜の外の景色見るの好きなのかな？
家の中の神様祭ってるピンクのライトと棚とか
人がご飯食べてたり
テレビ見てたり、
ご近所は車の修理屋さんなんだけど、
夜は
小さい道路に面した
お店の隣で
家族が食べてる。
寝るときはシャッターおろして
寝てるみたいだけど、
シャッター前回のときは、
その方のおうちの
ソファー、テレビ、ご飯丸見え。
てかなんでうち気になるんだろう？
見えないようにがんばらないんだなー
写真を撮りたいけど、
それはやっぱり失礼だと思うので、
とりません。。。
学校から家に帰るとき、
たくさんのアパート、マンションの
家の中が見えてしまうのですが、
みんな夜の外の景色見るの好きなのかな？
家の中の神様祭ってるピンクのライトと棚とか
人がご飯食べてたり
テレビ見てたり、
ご近所は車の修理屋さんなんだけど、
夜は
小さい道路に面した
お店の隣で
家族が食べてる。
寝るときはシャッターおろして
寝てるみたいだけど、
シャッター前回のときは、
その方のおうちの
ソファー、テレビ、ご飯丸見え。
てかなんでうち気になるんだろう？
見えないようにがんばらないんだなー
写真を撮りたいけど、
それはやっぱり失礼だと思うので、
とりません。。。
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